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Although much has been written on the 
topic of post-Yugoslav states in the con-
text of the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s and the war that followed, the 
issue of transition and democratisation 
of these states remains under-researched. 
This is largely due to the prevalence of a 
liberal orientation in the literature on post-
socialist states, and in particular to liberal 
dogma that “liberal states do not fi ght war 
with each other”. It was hard to explain 
that the war in the post-Yugoslav space 
in fact occured at the same time when all 
of Yugoslavia’s successor states accepted 
the democratisation of their political in-
stitutions. And then, when the war start-
ed, the transition did not pause but rather 
continued, being much shaped by the war 
itself. In these circumstances, the war was 
thus also used as a good excuse for the 
non-transparent practice of privatisation, 
corruption and clientelism, all of which 
had deep consequences for the social and 
economic situation in the years to come. 
However, the dominant approach to study-
ing these events was based on the as-
sumption that transition and war could not 
go together: transition is a peaceful and 
gradual transformation of the political, 
social and economic spheres as well as of 
the concept of statehood, and war is the 
sign of a failure of such transition. Thus, 
when discussing transition, social scien-
tists and analysts focused on East-Central 
Europe and (in some cases) Slovenia. The 
“Western Balkans” was left aside, as if it 
is a different story altogether.
In this respect, Mieczysław Bodu-
szyński’s book on regime change in the 
Yugoslav successor states makes a clear 
break with this “tradition”. The book is 
confi ned to the 1990s, and thus it offers an 
insight in political processes of the “ear-
ly”, or “fi rst” transition (from socialism to 
nationalism). Not much is said in the book 
on the later (post-2000) liberalisation of 
these new nationalist regimes, which in 
some cases coincides with EU accession. 
The author argues that the war and con-
fl icts were “dependent variables”, used 
and produced by political elites who want-
ed above all “to legitimise their undemo-
cratic policies”. In this way, Boduszyński 
interprets the war as result of a political 
game played by those who opposed libe-
ralisation. He calls the newly established 
post-Yugoslav regimes “illiberal national-
isms”. By classifying them as “illiberal”, 
Boduszyński in fact challenges a sim-
plistic view of some transitologists – that 
the whole former Eastern Europe went 
through a process of liberalisation after 
1989. In fact, his argument is that only 
some countries became “full democra-
cies” (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia), 
others were “nearly full democracies” 
(Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia), some were 
“formal democracies” (Georgia, Moldova, 
Russia, Ukraine and Macedonia), some 
“regimes between formal democracies 
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and authoritarianism” (Albania, Armenia, 
Croatia), or “semi-authoritarian regimes” 
(Azerbaijan, Kyrgistan, Kazakhstan and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina) and “authoritarian 
regimes” (Belorus, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, Uzbekistan and the former Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia). Although this 
classifi cation can be challenged in view 
of recent popular discontent in some of 
the countries classifi ed as “full democra-
cies” (for example, in Slovenia and possi-
bly also in Hungary), as well as in view of 
changes that took place after 2000 (in Ser-
bia, Montenegro and Croatia), the point is 
that successful democratisation was more 
of an exception than a rule in the former 
communist countries. 
The other interesting and methodologi-
cally useful innovation that this book of-
fers is in showing the high level of vari-
ability in the outputs of the process of 
transition. Although all post-Yugoslav 
states shared the Yugoslav historical and 
institutional context, they became rather 
different at the end of the 1990s. Slovenia 
is the only “substantive democracy”, with 
a high level of liberal content. The then 
FR Yugoslavia had a low liberal content, 
and towards the end of the 1990s it in fact 
sunk deeper into authoritarianism. Mace-
donia is a case of an “illegitimate de-
mocracy” with a much lower level of li-
beral contents than Slovenia and Croatia, 
while Croatia was a case of a “simulated 
democracy”, in which elites did not like 
democratisation but “faked it” in order to 
achieve their main objectives and to paci-
fy external critics. 
Whereas Slovenian politics was, in the 
1990s, inspired by the process of Europe-
anisation, democratisation and economic 
growth, Croatian politics was character-
ised by the notion of nationalism, defence, 
territorial integrity and a low level of li-
beralism. “The Tudjman regime used eth-
nic nationalism, authoritarian populism, 
and economic clientelism to consolidate 
and legitimize its hold on power. Early in 
Croatia’s post-communist transition, libe-
ral reform and integration into Western 
structures were deemphasized in favor of 
national issues” (p. 74). To this effect, the 
Croatian elite politically exploited the so-
called “Homeland War”, which was used 
“to justify anti-democratic politics and 
clientelistic practices by the ruling party” 
(p. 75). The conservative segments of the 
Croatian political space in fact keep the 
memory of the war permanently alive, in 
order to continue opposing signifi cant re-
forms. Interestingly, Boduszyński argues 
that opposition to Europe has become a 
substitute for its earlier anti-Serb rhetoric. 
HDZ, the ruling party of the 1990s did not 
openly reject membership in the EU, but 
it nevertheless moved Croatia ever further 
away from Europe by its various policies 
and its ideology. In short, Boduszyński ar-
gues, the fi rst ten years of Croatian post-
communist transition was characterised 
by the domination of non-liberal political 
forces. Since he does not say much about 
the post-2000 situation, it would be inter-
esting to see to what extent has this type 
of politics then changed in the last de-
cade. Is contemporary Croatia still a case 
of illiberal (or: semi-liberal) nationalism? 
Is there a realistic chance that antiliberal 
and nationalist policies return sometime 
in the future? 
When trying to explain the varie-
ty of systems in post-Yugoslav states, 
Boduszyński relies on two major vari-
ables that infl uenced the process of re-
gime change in the 1990s. One is found in 
the starting conditions in which transition 
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happened, primarily in the different eco-
nomic positions that the post-Yugoslav 
countries found themselves in. The other 
is the way domestic elites responded to 
pressure by external (ie. Western) actors: 
both those who offered EU integration 
and those who insisted on transitional jus-
tice (ICTY). The book argues that the dif-
ferent position of the post-Yugoslav states 
at the end of the 1990s can be largely ex-
plained by using these two variables. The 
external incentive for liberalisation can-
not produce liberal regimes, but it might 
play a decisive role in shaping transition. 
The other major point that this book 
makes is in challenging the view that the 
resistance to liberalisation and transfor-
mation is led and organised primarily by 
those social forces who are to become the 
losers in transition. Boduszyński argues 
that it was the political, economic and 
social elite in general who opposed chan-
ges in order to secure its power. Thus, the 
winners, not the losers have opposed li-
beralisation. The system worked for them, 
and they tried to keep the benefi ts of the 
controled regime change exclusively for 
themselves. 
Mieczysław Boduszyński’s book is to 
be recommended to all those who analyse 
political changes in the 1990s. It offers in-
teresting and rather useful methodologi-
cal tools for comparative analysis of tran-
sition in war-torn countries. In addition, 
it helps us to understand the motives and 
actions by political elites in the post-Yu-
goslav states during the fi rst decade since 
their independence. This book will also 
be useful to researchers of further trans-
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Re:vizija prošlosti: Politike sjećanja u 
Bosni i Hercegovini, Hrvatskoj i Srbiji 
od 1990. godine (Re:vision of the Past: 
The Politics of Memory in Bosnia-Herze-
govina, Croatia and Serbia since 1990) 
is a welcome sign that a new generation 
of scholars in the region is applying theo-
ries from memory studies to analyze the 
interactions between history and politics 
in the Yugoslav successor states. Although 
numerous studies have been produced 
about nationalism, transitional justice, and 
post-confl ict reconstruction in the former 
Yugoslavia, research into the politics of 
memory, especially by local academics, is 
a relatively new fi eld. This book is particu-
larly useful because it presents overviews 
of how three former Yugoslav republics – 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia 
– have dealt with not only World War Two 
but also the confl icts of the 1990s. As the 
authors show in their detailed texts, politi-
cal actors have often blurred the past and 
the present; they revised World War Two 
narratives to fi t the new ethno-nationalist 
discourses predominant after the wars from 
1991-1995, and incorporated selective ele-
ments of Partisan, Ustaša, or Četnik nar-
ratives into the commemorative practices 
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